Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif is reportedly set to meet US Secretary of State Marco Rubio in New York on September 22 on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly. Trade, investment, counterterrorism and regional diplomacy are expected to feature alongside Pakistan’s efforts to encourage dialogue amid continuing Middle East tensions.
The meeting comes at an important moment in US-Pakistan ties. The agenda is broader than it has been for years, extending beyond the security concerns that traditionally defined bilateral relations.
Pakistan has occupied an important place in US strategy before. During the Cold War, the anti-Soviet campaign in Afghanistan and the post-9/11 era, cooperation expanded when Washington needed Pakistan’s geography, intelligence or security support. As those strategic priorities evolved, the scope and intensity of bilateral engagement also changed.
The emerging model is different. Rather than resting on one overriding strategic problem, it increasingly draws on several narrower interests- finance, trade, technology, energy, critical minerals and counterterrorism that can retain value on their own.
Economics moves closer to the center
The clearest sign of that shift is financial.
Pakistan has requested a $10 billion exchange-stabilization facility from Washington. Finance Minister Muhammad Aurangzeb said on September 17 that Islamabad expects a US response within roughly two months. Pakistan is also discussing financing with the US Export-Import Bank and the US International Development Finance Corporation, including possible support for aircraft purchases and a planned refinery-upgrade program.
At the same time, Islamabad plans to seek an expansion of its 30-billion-yuan currency-swap arrangement with China when it comes up for renewal in 2027. The current facility has been fully utilized.
The parallel negotiations illustrate Pakistan’s approach: deepen economic ties with Washington while preserving its long-standing strategic and economic partnership with Beijing.
The commercial base remains modest but tangible. US goods and services trade with Pakistan reached an estimated $11.5 billion in 2025, up 14% from the previous year. Pakistan’s ICT-services exports also rose 21% to $4.6 billion in fiscal 2025.
Pakistan’s scale strengthens the case. With roughly 255 million people and an economy above $400 billion, it offers a substantial consumer, labour and services market. Its position between China, Afghanistan, Iran and the Arabian Sea, with access toward Central Asian and Gulf markets, gives commercial significance to geography more often viewed through a security lens.
Technology provides perhaps the clearest example of cooperation that does not require a geopolitical emergency. Software, digital services, fintech and business-to-business investment can grow because firms identify commercial value even when Washington and Islamabad differ on other regional questions.
Energy could become another practical area. Prospective US financing for refinery upgrades would place energy infrastructure alongside trade and technology in the expanding economic agenda, while supporting a sector central to Pakistan’s long-term growth and energy security.
Minerals offer opportunity and a test
Critical minerals could add another economic-security dimension.
Washington is placing greater emphasis on resilient mineral supply chains, while Pakistan is seeking foreign investment in copper, gold and other resources. Yet geological potential must still be translated into commercially viable projects.
Reko Diq in Balochistan illustrates both the promise and the complexity. The copper-gold project could eventually generate substantial activity in mining, engineering, transport and processing. Barrick said in April that it was slowing development and extending its review until mid-2027 while reassessing security conditions, financing, capital requirements, project scope and timing.
The broader lesson is that mineral resources generate the greatest strategic value when infrastructure, financing, regulatory frameworks, security arrangements and investor confidence support long-term development.
Pakistan’s case therefore rests not only on the scale of its resources, but also on whether major projects can become bankable, secure and integrated into global supply chains.
Security still anchors the relationship
The broader economic agenda does not diminish the continuing importance of counterterrorism.
On September 16, Mohammad Sharifullah, an ISIS-K operative involved in preparations for the 2021 Abbey Gate bombing in Kabul, was sentenced in the United States to 20 years in prison. The attack killed 13 US service members and scores of Afghan civilians. Sharifullah was apprehended in 2025 before being transferred to the United States for prosecution.
His case offered a concrete example of cooperation against a threat of direct concern to Washington.
Pakistan also continues to bear a heavy domestic cost from militancy. Its Foreign Ministry said in August that more than 90,000 Pakistanis had been killed and economic losses had exceeded $150 billion during the country’s fight against terrorism.
The fourth US-Pakistan Counterterrorism Dialogue in August addressed border security, terrorist facilitation networks and threats from ISIS-K, al-Qaeda, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and the Balochistan Liberation Army and its affiliates.
Counterterrorism thus remains a practical foundation for cooperation. What has changed is that it no longer has to carry the entire bilateral agenda.
From access to staying power
High-level diplomacy has also become more regular.
Sharif and Rubio met in Washington in February and agreed to expand trade, economic activity and counterterrorism cooperation. In May, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar met Rubio again to discuss economic ties, cultural cooperation and security. Pakistan’s official account said Rubio also acknowledged Islamabad’s diplomatic and mediatory efforts.
Those contacts matter, but the deeper measure of progress will be whether they lead to durable economic and institutional outcomes.
More meaningful indicators will be long-term US private investment, economic dialogue that survives political disagreements, mineral and technology projects that move from announcements to implementation, and counterterrorism coordination that continues when no immediate emergency dominates Washington’s agenda.
Education, professional exchanges, business networks and technology partnerships provide another, quieter layer of continuity. These channels rarely attract the attention of summit diplomacy, but they can preserve links between the two countries when official relations become more difficult.
Pakistan’s simultaneous engagement with China reinforces the broader logic.
Beijing remains a long-term strategic partner in infrastructure, finance and trade. Washington offers different advantages: access to the dollar-centered financial system, US capital, technology and global commercial networks. Gulf states add energy, investment, remittances and security ties.
These relationships serve different purposes. Diversification can widen Islamabad’s room to manoeuvre and give Pakistan greater flexibility in pursuing its economic and strategic interests across multiple partnerships.
Pakistan does not need to recreate the sweeping US partnerships of the Cold War or Afghanistan era. A narrower arrangement may prove more sustainable precisely because neither side has to depend on a single strategic bargain.
Trade can endure because companies see markets. Technology ties can grow because firms find commercial value. Mineral investment can advance when projects are viable and secure. Counterterrorism can continue where threat perceptions overlap.
Pakistan has Washington’s attention again. The more consequential question is whether these separate interests still give both sides reasons to cooperate once the crisis that brought them closer no longer sets the agenda.
